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South African Tax Performance: 
Some Perspectives and International Comparisons1
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Over recent decades, the South African central government tax revenues as share of gross 
domestic product (GDP) have risen steadily and particularly sharply since 2000.   The 
central government tax yield rose from about 15% of GDP in 1960 to 17% in 1970, to 
19% in 1980, rose further to 23% in 1990, and then stalled at about 23% through the 
1990s before rising again to over 26% in 2008.  Not all of this revenue yield increase, 
however, could be attributed to economic growth.  By a number of measures, real per 
capita GDP 2
 
 rose to a peak in 1981, but then steadily declined by some 18.5% to a 
trough in 1993 (ironically the last year of the apartheid era), before rising again to the 
levels of 1981 by 2007.   While increasing per capita GDP typically allows low and 
middle-income countries to raise higher tax yields, other factors also significantly affect 
revenue performance, including improved tax policies, changing economic structures and 
compliance-enhancing tax administration.  With the enactment of the South Africa 
Revenue Service (SARS) as a semi-autonomous authority in 1997, the effectiveness and 
efficiency of tax administration to broaden the tax bases and enhance tax compliance has 
no doubt improved, but there is not sufficient public data to analyze the impact of SARS 
on revenue performance.  This paper, therefore, focuses on the impacts of changing tax 
policy and a changing economic environment, both national and international, on the 
revenue performance in South Africa with a particular focus on recent developments 
since 2000. 
This paper presents the broad trends in tax performance in South Africa.  The intent is to 
focus on the major factors affecting this performance drawing comparisons with tax 
policy and performance internationally.  This should assist in objective predictions of 
future trends as well as some recommendations for potential new directions or 
perspectives on tax policy.  A particular focus is on the remarkable increase in the tax 
yield from the income tax on companies since 2000 from about 3% to nearly 8% of GDP.  
Why this occurred and whether it will continue is clearly of major consequence to the 
overall tax performance in South Africa.   
 
The paper first discusses the changing mix and trends in the major tax types of the central 
government in South Africa.  Second it makes some comments on the tax effort in South 
Africa in recent decades relative to comparable countries.  Finally, some analysis of the 
                                                 
1 The author wishes to thank Cecil Morden, Unathi Kamlana and Basil Maseko of the National Treasury for 
their assistance in the preparation of this paper. All data unless otherwise indicated was supplied by the 
National Treasury or taken from Reserve Bank of South Africa data series, or from South African Revenue 
Service publications or National Budget documents.  The opinions expressed are solely those of the author 
who is also responsible for any errors or omissions.   
2 Per capital GDP measured in terms of constant rand values, constant US dollars or purchasing power 
parity measured in constant international dollars. 
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economic factors explaining the increase in individual and company taxes is presented 
followed by some discussion of international trends in company taxation and its 
implications for tax policy in South Africa.  
 
Tax composition and trends 
 
The analysis of the composition and trends in South African central government revenues 
is based on 1983/84 through 2007/08.  This 25 year period gives 10 years of the apartheid 
period prior to the democratic era starting in with the elections in 1994.  It also coincides 
with the period of data provided by the National Treasury and also drawn from the 2008 
and earlier Budget documents.  Tables 1A and 1B present the tax revenues by tax type 
over this period.  Figure 1 presents the four major components of the tax revenues – 
individual income tax, company income tax, sales tax/value-added tax and excise duties 
plus other levies. 
 
The total tax revenues (net of SACU payments3) have largely been steady over most of 
the period under study.  After the tax yield rose gradually through the 1960s and 1970s, 
from 1984/85 through 2003/04 the tax yield stayed in a narrow band around about 22% 
of GDP.  Starting in 2004/05, however, the tax yield started on an upward trend reaching 
26.7% in 2007/08, largely supported by increased income taxes from companies and to a 
lesser extent the VAT.   More detailed comment is provided below about these revenue 
yields, but here it is sufficient to note that 22% is above the averages for central 
government tax yields of lower middle-income countries in 2000 of 18.6% and upper 
middle-income countries of 20.4% (South Africa is in the middle of the middle-income 
range), but significantly below the 38.6% of high-income OECD countries, even if the 
11% of GDP in social security contributions is removed from the total tax revenues.4
 
  
Importantly, however, a net-of-social security tax yield of 27.6% of GDP by these high-
income OECD countries is in a similar range to the current tax yield in South Africa. 
Income tax 
While the overall tax yield in South Africa has been reasonably steady, aside from the 
recent upward surge, the composition of these revenues has been less constant.  The 
income tax has been the backbone of South African tax revenues providing between 55% 
and 60% of revenues over the 25 year period, but the company tax (including the 
secondary tax on companies (SCT)), in particular, has been highly volatile varying 
between 10% and 28% of revenues.  Increases in individual income tax revenues have 
generally offset declines in company taxes, and vice-versa, as illustrated in Figure 1, 
keeping the share of total income taxes more steady.  Given the importance of the income 
tax, it is analyzed in greater detail below.  
                                                 
3 Import duties and specific excises collected by the member states of the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU) – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and Swaziland – are collected into a pool by the 
South African National Treasury and then distributed out to the member states according to agreed 
formulas.  The data in Tables 1A and IB for import duties, excise duties and total revenues are provided net 
of these distribution payments to the other SACU member states.  
4 See Table 1 in Graham Glenday, “Towards fiscally feasible and efficient trade liberalization,”  study 
prepared under the Fiscal Reform in Support of Trade Liberalization Project, DAI/USAID, May 18, 2006 
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1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98
Tax on:
Income and profits 11.5% 12.1% 13.2% 12.6% 12.1% 12.2% 13.1% 13.2% 13.0% 12.5% 11.5% 12.3% 12.2% 13.0% 13.6%
of which Individuals 5.9% 6.8% 6.9% 6.7% 7.0% 6.8% 7.6% 8.1% 8.7% 8.9% 8.5% 9.0% 9.1% 9.4% 9.8%
Retirement funds 0.4% 0.5%
Companies 5.3% 5.0% 6.0% 5.5% 4.9% 5.1% 5.3% 4.9% 4.1% 3.4% 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 3.1%
Secondary tax on 
companies (STC) 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
Company & STC 5.3% 5.0% 6.0% 5.5% 4.9% 5.1% 5.3% 4.9% 4.1% 3.4% 2.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 3.3%
Interest on overdue 
income tax 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Payroll
Skill Development Levy
Property 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4%
of which Donations tax & estate 
duty 0.09% 0.09% 0.11% 0.10% 0.08% 0.06% 0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05%
Transfer duty 0.32% 0.25% 0.20% 0.18% 0.25% 0.25% 0.26% 0.26% 0.24% 0.24% 0.24% 0.28% 0.27% 0.27% 0.26%
Marketable security tax 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.09% 0.12% 0.06% 0.11% 0.08% 0.06% 0.04% 0.06% 0.09% 0.08% 0.06% 0.06%
Domestic Goods and Service 5.6% 6.8% 7.7% 7.1% 7.0% 8.1% 8.9% 8.4% 7.8% 7.3% 8.4% 8.5% 8.3% 8.1% 8.2%
of which Sales Tax/VAT 4.0% 5.2% 6.2% 5.8% 5.7% 6.0% 6.4% 6.1% 5.5% 4.6% 5.7% 5.9% 5.8% 5.6% 5.7%
Specific excise duties 
(net of SACU payments) 1.3% 1.2% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
Ad valorem excise duties 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Fuel levy 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 1.2% 1.6% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9% 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7%
Excises and levies 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.3% 1.4% 2.1% 2.5% 2.3% 2.4% 2.7% 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.5%
International Trade
Customs duties & 
charges (net of SACU) 1.1% 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 1.1% 1.7% 1.5% 1.2% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.5%
Other taxes
Stamp duties and other 
fees 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2%
18.8% 20.4% 22.5% 21.4% 21.0% 22.5% 24.2% 23.4% 22.1% 21.1% 21.2% 22.2% 21.8% 22.4% 22.8%
Tax Revenue (net of SACU 
payments)
Souce:  National Treasury, South Africa
Table 1A.    Revenues as a share of GDP for major tax types of central government, South Africa, 1983/84-1997/98
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1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08*
Tax on:
Income and profits 11.5% 12.3% 12.2% 13.0% 13.6% 14.3% 13.9% 13.2% 14.0% 13.7% 13.3% 13.6% 14.6% 15.5% 16.2%
of which Individuals 8.5% 9.0% 9.1% 9.4% 9.8% 10.3% 10.3% 9.1% 8.6% 7.9% 7.6% 7.8% 7.9% 7.8% 8.2%
Retirement funds 0.4% 0.5% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.6% 0.6% 0.4% 0.3% 0.3% 0.2%
Companies 2.6% 2.7% 2.8% 3.0% 3.1% 3.0% 2.5% 3.1% 4.0% 4.7% 4.7% 4.9% 5.4% 6.6% 6.9%
Secondary tax on 
companies (STC) 0.2% 0.3% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.7% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.8% 0.8% 1.0%
Company & STC 2.8% 3.0% 3.0% 3.2% 3.3% 3.2% 2.9% 3.5% 4.7% 5.2% 5.2% 5.5% 6.2% 7.4% 7.9%
Interest on overdue 
income tax 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Payroll
Skill Development Levy 0.1% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
Property 0.3% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6%
of which Donations tax & estate 
duty 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.04% 0.04% 0.05% 0.05% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
Transfer duty 0.24% 0.28% 0.27% 0.27% 0.26% 0.21% 0.22% 0.25% 0.28% 0.29% 0.40% 0.50% 0.54% 0.37% 0.38%
Marketable security tax 0.06% 0.09% 0.08% 0.06% 0.06% 0.10% 0.13% 0.12% 0.12% 0.10% 0.09% 0.10% 0.12% 0.15% 0.20%
Domestic Goods and Service 8.4% 8.5% 8.3% 8.1% 8.2% 8.3% 8.1% 7.8% 7.9% 7.8% 8.1% 8.8% 9.2% 9.1% 8.9%
of which Sales Tax/VAT 5.7% 5.9% 5.8% 5.6% 5.7% 5.8% 5.8% 5.7% 5.8% 5.9% 6.3% 6.9% 7.2% 7.4% 7.2%
Specific excise duties 
(net of SACU payments) 0.7% 0.8% 0.7% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4%
Ad valorem  excise 
duties 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Fuel levy 1.8% 1.7% 1.6% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 1.7% 1.5% 1.4% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3% 1.2% 1.2%
Excises and levies 2.7% 2.6% 2.5% 2.4% 2.5% 2.6% 2.4% 2.1% 2.0% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.9% 1.7% 1.7%
International Trade
Customs duties & 
charges (net of SACU) 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.5% 0.7% 0.5% 0.6%
Other taxes
Stamp duties and other 
fees 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.03% 0.03%
21.2% 22.2% 21.8% 22.4% 22.8% 23.8% 23.1% 22.3% 23.2% 22.8% 22.7% 23.9% 25.4% 26.0% 26.7%
* Revised estimate
Tax Revenue (net of SACU 
payments)
Table 1B.    Revenues as a share of GDP for major tax types of central government, South Africa, 1993/84-2007/08
Souce:  National Treasury, South Africa
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Figure 1.  Major tax type revenues as share of GDP, 
South Africa, 1983/84-2007/08
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Sales Tax/VAT 
Since 1984/85, when the sales tax rate was raised from 6% to 10%, the sales tax, and later 
its replacement the VAT, has provided a steady source of revenue forming about 26% of 
total revenues.   In 1992/93, a 13% sales tax was replaced by a 10% credit-method VAT 
After a year the standard VAT rate was raised to 14% where it has remained.  After a 
slow start with revenue yields below 6% of GDP, falling slightly below the earlier sales 
tax yields, since 2003/04, however, revenues have risen to around 7% of GDP.  VAT 
registrations have been climbing steadily since 2000 at nearly 7% per annum, suggesting 
SARS has been active in supporting VAT compliance.  A VAT yield of 7% from a 14% 
standard rate represents a solid performance in tax administration and compliance.  For 
example, the 19 OECD countries with high standard VAT rates (taken as those over 
17.5%) collect on average about 8% of GDP at and average standard rate of 21%.  It is 
important to note, however, that all but 2 of these 19 OECD countries have one or two 
reduced rates (set at about a half or less of their standard rates) in addition to their 
standard rate, which would significantly lower their effective VAT rates closer to the 
14% in South Africa.   While tax efficiency improvements are always possible, it is 
unlikely that South Africa will experience any significant further improvement in its 
VAT yield in the medium term.  
 
Excises 
Excise duties and levies (such as the fuel levy) have formed a modest and variable share 
of revenues ranging between 6% and 13% of revenues over the 25 year period.  Currently 
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excises and levies yield 1.7% of GDP in revenues and are at the low end of the historical 
range of revenue shares.  The highest yield was in 1998/99 at 2.6% of GDP with the 
majority of revenue coming from the fuel levy.   The 30 OECD countries average about 
3% of GDP in excise revenues with Turkey at the top end of the distribution at over 6% 
of GDP from its special consumption taxes in addition to its VAT.   Expanded use of 
excise taxes offers an option for revenue increases.  To some extent, South Africa has 
been reluctant to expand its use of excise because the sharing of the specific excise duties 
under the 1969 SACU agreement was biased against South Africa.  Since the 
implementation in 2005 of the new 2002 SACU Agreement that shares excise revenues 
largely in proportion to GDP, South Africa may be less averse to using these excises to 
enhance revenues. 
 
Import duties 
In line with international trends over the past few decades, South Africa has decreased its 
use of import duties as a revenue source down to only 2% of its total tax revenues.  Over 
the period 1975 through 2000, for example, a sample of middle-income countries reduced 
their average trade tax yields from about 6% to 3.7% of GDP.  Over the 25 year period of 
this study, South Africa reduced its use of import duties from 1.1% to 0.6% of GDP.  
South Africa, however, did make increased use of trade protection during the period of 
international economic sanctions against apartheid South Africa.  Import duty yields 
peaked at 1.7% of GDP in 1988/89.  While most low-income countries and about a third 
of lower middle income countries that lowered their use of trade tax revenues over 1975-
2000 were unable to replace these tax losses with increased domestic taxes,5
 
 South Africa 
has readily managed to offset its import duty losses with VAT and income tax increases. 
Transfer and property taxes 
South Africa charges a number of taxes on property – estate duty and donations tax, 
transfer duty and marketable securities tax – which in combination collect about 0.6% of 
GDP or just over 2% of revenues.   The transfer duty which is charged at 8% on property 
transfers6
 
 forms 60% of these revenues.   Transfer taxes by their nature are arbitrary and 
distort market transactions given they only apply if and when a transfer occurs.  They 
also compete with annual recurrent property rates for the same tax base.  Given the trend 
towards decentralization of government in South Africa, opening up the land and 
buildings property base to local authority taxation would appear to be a preferable 
allocation of taxation powers and the transfer duty could be phased out. 
Payroll taxes 
Since 2000/01, the skill development levy has been collected at 1% of payroll through the 
budget as tax revenues amounting to 0.3% of GDP.  In addition, a 2% contribution of 
payroll (on the first R11,622 per month) has to be contributed to the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund (UIF).   These contributions amount to over 0.4% of GDP.  In addition, 
employers pay premiums into the Compensation Fund for Occupational Injuries and 
                                                 
5 Baunsgaard, Thomas and Michael Keen, “Tax Revenue and (or?) Trade Liberalization” International 
Monetary Fund, IMF Working Paper WP/05/112 (June 2005) 
6 For individual acquiring property rate is 0% on first R500,000, 5% on the next R500,000, and 8% on the 
amount above R1,000,000. 
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Diseases amounting to 0.15% of GDP.  Payroll taxes have been the traditional source of 
funds internationally for social security programs.  Aside from the contributions just 
listed, South Africa to date has funded social security benefits out of general revenues.  
As announced with the 2008 Budget, consideration is being given to an expanded social 
security system for South Africa.  This will no doubt require added social security 
contributions charged on payroll to supplement the draw on the budget revenues.  Added 
payroll taxes will increase the total tax on employment and potentially slow down 
employment growth in the formal sector of the economy.  Currently marginal tax rates 
(MTRs) on individual income range from 18% on the first R122,000 of annual income up 
to 40% of amounts in excess of R490,000 per year.  In addition, the skill development 
levy and UIF contributions add about 3% in the bottom bracket and 1% to other brackets 
on employment compensation.  Higher payroll taxes to fund social security may require 
further reductions in the MTRs in the personal income tax.  
 
Tax effort 
Another approach to comparing total tax yields across countries is to consider the tax 
effort of a country.  Tax effort is defined as the actual tax yield compared to the tax yield 
of countries with similar economic features.  Importantly the features should be those that 
affect the productivity of taxes – make tax collection and compliance either easier or 
more difficult.  One way of making this comparison is choosing other countries with 
similar features and making the comparison.  A more sophisticated way is developing an 
explanatory model that predicts the tax yield of countries based on the tax-relevant 
features of an economy.  For example, tax collection should be more productive in 
economies with large mining sectors or with large volumes of trade following through 
well managed airports or seaports.  By contrast, economies with large informal sectors in 
their agricultural or urban sectors are expected to have difficulty collecting taxes.  Models 
of tax yields that control for the features of an economy that predict the ease or difficulty 
of tax collections are said to estimate the tax capacity of economies.  The tax effort is 
then found by comparing actual tax yields compared to the estimated tax capacity (or the 
tax yield of the country controlling for its economic features that affect tax productivity.) 
 
The tax performance of South Africa can be judged based on its tax effort.  Recent 
estimates of tax capacity by this author are used.  One study of tax capacity is based on 
the tax performance of 13 member states of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) over 1990-2001.7   These estimates showed South Africa with a tax 
effort of 1.05 (or 5% above its estimated tax capacity) on average over the period and 
11% above its estimated capacity in 2001 as revenue yields increased.  A second study of 
tax capacity is based on tax yield data for 123 countries over 1975-2000.8
                                                 
7   Chapter 6 in Graham Glenday, “Assessment of the Current State of VAT Implementation in SADC 
Member States”  Report prepared for the Trade, Industry, Finance and Investment (TIFI) Directorate of the 
Southern African Development Community, August 15, 2004, revised November 30, 2005 
  Two sets of 
estimates of tax capacity were made.  One based only on countries with low-incomes and 
lower middle-incomes, and the other on the full sample.  Both sets of estimates of tax 
8  Annex E in Graham Glenday, “Towards fiscally feasible and efficient trade liberalization,”  study 
prepared under the Fiscal Reform in Support of Trade Liberalization Project, DAI/USAID, May 18, 2006 
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capacity for South Africa give similar results.  In 1975, the South African tax effort was 
some 15% below its estimated tax capacity.  It gradually rose to its estimated tax capacity 
by the mid-1980s and then continued to rise to be 15% above capacity by 2000.  With the 
continued rise in tax yields through 2007/06, the tax effort has risen further to be some 
20% above capacity. 
 
 
Individual income tax performance:  
Economic determinants and tax policy issues 
 
The individual income tax has been the largest source of tax revenue.  It is also arguably 
the most politically sensitive tax given its direct nature and differentiation by individual 
income level, particularly since the transition from the apartheid to the democratic eras.  
The tax rate structure on individual income has undergone significant changes to 
accommodate and encourage compliance by a broader tax base.  For example, comparing 
2008/09 with 1995/96, there has been a reduction in the rate brackets from 8 to 6, and 
after adjusting for inflation, the width of the bottom bracket has been expanded by 
285%,9
 
 the threshold at which tax becomes payable increased by 49%, and the start of the 
top tax bracket by 190%.  At the same time the top marginal tax rate (MTR) was lowered 
from 45% to 40%.   These moves clearly serve a number of competing needs.  First, they 
provide increased protection for low-income individuals and lower the entry barriers into 
formal employment.  Second, the expand bracket widths ease the tax burden on the 
middle-income earners.  Third, lowering the top tax rate helps make South Africa more 
competitive to retain and attract professional and high skill workers to the extent that tax 
burdens become a factor in worker location choices.  Figure 2 illustrates some of the 
changes to the individual income tax structure since 1984. 
A basic question that emerges is whether the top MTR in South Africa of 40% is in the 
“right” range.  As will be noted below, this top rate has significant impact on revenues, 
but at the same time concerns arise about the rate in terms of its impact on attracting and 
retaining top workers and investment.  Ultimately, the willingness of a population to pay 
combined with the capacity of the country to enforce high tax rates limits the maximum 
efficient tax rate, even where labor migration is not a factor and market labor supply can 
be taken as being relatively inelastic.  When compared to OECD countries, this rate 
seems reasonable.  The average top statutory rate among these countries was 46% in 
2000 (ranging from 32% to 63.9%).10
                                                 
9  The expansion of the bottom bracket is strictly 1056% if the R5,000 at 17% is as the bottom bracket.  For 
better comparability of the change in tax structure, the first three brackets at 17%, 18% and 19%, 
respectively, up to R15,000 are taken as one bracket.  These three brackets were in fact combined in 
1996/97 and that structure retained through 2008/09 when the first bracket charges 18% on the first 
R122,000. 
  By 2006, the average top statutory rate had fallen 
to 43% (ranging from 19% to 59.7%).  When compared to a selection of low- and 
middle-income countries, however, there are many countries with lower top MTR rates:  
Russia, 13%; Ukraine, 15%;  Egypt, 20%; Ghana, Uruguay, 25%; Brazil, 27.5%; 
Malaysia, 28%; Botswana, India, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 30%; Pakistan, 30% on 
10 SourceOECD Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, Comparative Tables Vol 2007 release 01 
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employment income, 35% on other income; Philippines, 32%; Argentine, Namibia, 35%; 
and Thailand, 37%.  There are also others with the same or higher MTR such as Chile 
and Taiwan, 40%; and China 45%.11
 
   
Figure 2  Key features of the individual income tax rate structure
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Another major consideration in comparing tax rates on individual income is the added tax 
on employment arising from social security contributions.  This can markedly increase 
the tax on employment earnings, often more among low income workers than high where 
there are caps on the income levels covered by social security.  Among OECD countries, 
social security contributions currently add about 28% to the tax rate on the average 
worker wage.  This ranges, however, from zero in New Zealand (with a top MTR of 
39%) to 55.3% in France (with a top MTR of 55.9%).  Social security contributions 
clearly change the costs of compensating workers from the employers’ perspective (to the 
extent the tax burden falls on the employer), but they also may have different impacts on 
workers across countries depending upon the package of health and financial security 
benefits arising from a social security scheme, and to what extent these substitute for 
private provision of these services either by employers or the employees themselves.  As 
noted above, the current consideration of expanded social security benefits in South 
Africa will require careful analysis of the effects of any additional social security 
contributions on payroll or self-employed income in conjunction with the existing tax rate 
structure on individual incomes. 
 
 
                                                 
11 PriceWaterhouseCoopers, Worldwide Tax Summaries Online 
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A final key aspect of the changes to the individual income tax is the impact on the 
individual revenue collections.  As has been illustrated above, individual income taxes 
rose from a 5.9% of GDP in 1983/84 to a peak of 10.3% of GDP in 1998/99 before 
gradually declining to 7.6% of GDP in 2003/04 and then recovering somewhat to 8.2% in 
2007/08.  The revenue effects of the complex set of changes to the overall tax structure 
over the past decade cannot be adequately explained without access to the detailed micro-
data files of the income returns in order to assess the separate contributions of the 
changes in bracket widths, tax rates, employment income patterns and tax compliance 
over the years.  Here, some analysis is attempted based on some aggregate economic and 
tax structure indicators.  In Annex A, an estimation is made of the determinants on the 
annual real income tax revenues (adjusted to 2000 year values by the CPI) over 1983/84 
through 2007/08.  
 
The results of this analysis show that individual income tax revenue has increased by 
about 0.5% for a 1% increase in real GDP, and 0.9% for each 1% increase in real wage 
rates.  Real increases in per capita income tend to push taxpayers income higher tax 
brackets causing increases in the effective income tax rate they pay.  Real wage rates 
increased steadily over recent decades, averaging 3.4% during the 1990s and 2.6% over 
2000-2006.  By contrast, increases in employment had no significant impact on income 
taxes (other than through increasing GDP).  Employment growth was flat or even 
negative during periods from 1983 up to 2000, but since then private sector employment 
has increased rapidly at an average annual rate of 12.3%.  As will be discussed further 
below, most of this wage growth is likely to have disproportionately added taxpayers to 
the lower brackets and not raised (or even lowered) the effective tax rate.  Finally, raising 
the top MTR by one percentage point increased the revenues by 1.5%.  Typically, in 
lower and middle income countries, the income in the top bracket forms a large share of 
the taxable income, and hence, revenues are sensitive to the tax rate.12
 
   
Company income tax performance:  
Economic determinants and tax policy issues 
 
The rapid growth in company tax revenues (including secondary company tax) in South 
Africa from 2.9% in 1999/2000 to 7.9% in 2007/08 demands an understanding of its 
determinants. (See Table 1.B. and Figure 1.)  This is important in forecasting future 
revenues and in setting future company tax rates.   In general, for an ad valorem tax at 
rate, t, on a base, B, the revenues, R, are simply t*B.  If the base is expressed as a share of 
GDP, Y, then revenues can be expressed as R=t*(B/Y)*Y.  As long as the base grows at 
the same rate as the economy, or (B/Y) stays constant, then we expect the tax revenue to 
grow at the same rate as the economy (or to have a tax elasticity of one) and the revenues 
as a share of GDP to stay constant, R/Y = t*(B/Y).   Clearly R/Y for the company tax has 
not been constant over the period under study as illustrated by Figure 1.  In addition, a 
                                                 
12 To check on the effect of the change in the political regime, a dummy variable for the apartheid era 
(years up to 1993/94) was created under the expectation that the apartheid period would be characterized by 
a narrower taxpayer base and higher non-compliance responses to tax rate increases.  Within the limitations 
of the aggregate tax data available, however, a change in the pattern of taxpayer responses to a complex set 
of tax structure changes did not emerge in to support such expectations. 
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simple estimation of the company income tax against GDP alone yields an elasticity of 
3.9 – clearly markedly above unity.  While the company tax rate has not stayed constant 
over time (see Table 2), it has not changed enough to explain the fluctuations in company 
tax yields.  In fact, Figure 3 illustrates that low company tax yields corresponded with 
high tax rates in a number of years.  Hence, there is a need to explain the source of the 
large fluctuations in company tax base over time to explain the variations in the company 
tax yield.   
 
A starting point in seeking explanations is to review the changes in the distribution of 
value added in the South African economy over time.  The GDP at factor costs can be 
divided into the share paid as labor compensation, the share to depreciation of the fixed 
capital assets used in production, and the remaining share referred to as net operating 
surplus that gets distributed between the debt financiers, the equity financiers and the 
government as taxes on profits and capital.   Hence, if capital earns an increasing share of 
the gross value added, then the company tax base out of added GDP growth is expected 
to be growing.  In fact, Figure 3 shows the net operating surplus as a share of GDP 
increasing from around 25% in 1983 to 30% in 1995 and then moving up again from 
2000 through 2006 to reach about 35%.   
 
Net operating surplus or profit margins can increase for many reasons, including 
improvements in productivity, exchange devaluations, wage and interest rate declines, 
and product price increases.   Real product price increases are clearly the most important 
of these as they affect the gross revenues out of which profits are earned.  Figures 4 and 5 
show a number of key product price indices relative to the CPI (2000 set at 100) in South 
Africa rising above the consumer price index (CPI) from 2000 onwards.  These include 
the price indices for all products for domestic use, base metal products, manufactures, 
and importantly, the price index for exports of goods and services.   This period of real 
price increases clearly corresponds with the period during which the company tax 
revenue yield increased sharply.  Looking back in time, it is also clear that these indices 
also exceeded the CPI in the 1980s when the company tax yield was high before 
declining in the early 1990s.  Interestingly, in the period 1998-2002, the devaluation of 
the Rand raised price of domestic tradables and, most importantly, the price of exports.   
As Figure 5 illustrates, however, the strengthening of the Rand13
                                                 
13 The real exchange rate is measured here by the REER (2000=100) for South Africa from the IMF 
International Financial Statistics, but expressed in terms of Rand per foreign currency unit. 
 after 2002 is eventually 
offset by the major increases in world prices for a broad range of metal, mineral and 
agricultural products from 2004 onwards.  In the estimations of the determinants of the 
corporate tax revenues presented here, the product price indices are expressed relative to 
the CPI to capture the fluctuations in the profit margins available to companies.  For 
example, over the time period in this study, the price index for all domestic-use products 
relative to the CPI dropped from a high of 117 in 1983 to a low of 98 in 1998 and rose 
back to 113 by 2007.  The base metal product price index relative to the CPI dropped 
from 122 in 1983 to 98 in 1997 before rising to 120 by 2007.  Similarly, but more 
dramatically, the export price index relative to the CPI dropped from a high of 138 in 
1985 to a low of 85 in 1995 before rising to 132 in 2007.   
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Financial 
year
Company 
tax rate
Surcharge/ 
Levy
Secondary 
Company 
Tax
Tax with no 
profits 
distributed
Tax on 30% 
of before 
tax profits 
distributed
Tax on fully 
distributed 
profits
Top MTR 
in PIT
1984 42% 10% 46.2% 46.2% 46.2% 50%
1985 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
1986 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
1987 50% 50% 50% 50% 50%
1988 50% 50% 50% 50% 45%
1989 50% 50% 50% 50% 45%
1990 50% 50% 50% 50% 45%
1991 50% 50% 50% 50% 45%
1992 50% 50% 50% 50% 44%
1993 48% 48% 48% 48% 43%
1994 48% 15% 48% 52.5% 55.8% 43%
1995 35% 5% 25% 40% 47.5% 51.3% 43%
1996 35% 25% 35% 42.5% 51.3% 45%
1997 35% 13% 35% 38.8% 43.1% 45%
1998 35% 13% 35% 38.8% 43.1% 45%
1999 35% 13% 35% 38.8% 43.1% 45%
2000 30% 13% 30% 33.8% 38.8% 45%
2001 30% 13% 30% 33.8% 38.8% 42%
2002 30% 13% 30% 33.8% 38.8% 42%
2003 30% 13% 30% 33.8% 38.8% 40%
2004 30% 13% 30% 33.8% 38.8% 40%
2005 30% 13% 30% 33.8% 38.8% 40%
2006 29% 13% 29% 32.8% 37.9% 40%
2007 29% 13% 29% 32.8% 37.9% 40%
2008 29% 10% 29% 32.0% 36.1% 40%
2009 28% 10% 28% 31.0% 35.2% 40%
SCT coverted to final withholding tax in 2008/09.  
Undistributed Profits Tax excluded for 1980/81-1989/90
Table 2.   Company tax rates on distributed profits, 1983/84-2008/09
  
 
 
Estimations of the determinants of company tax revenues over 1983/84-2006/07 are 
presented in Annex B.  The first formulation (in Table B.1) estimates the company tax 
yield (R/Y) in terms of the net operating surplus share of GDP and the price indices of all 
products for domestic use and exports relative to the CPI, company tax rate14
                                                 
14  Company tax rate is taken as tax rate including secondary company tax assuming 30% dividend 
distribution of before tax profits. 
 and either 
net operating surplus relative to GDP, or real GDP, or log of real GDP.  These estimates 
have reasonably good fits (explaining about 87% to 95% of the variation in R/Y) and 
suggest that a one percentage point increase in the share of net operating surplus leads to 
a 0.2 percentage point increase in the company tax yield, and tax elasticities of real GDP 
relative to GDP of 1.5 to 1.7.  The estimate of the tax elasticities of the real price of all 
domestic-use products is 2.5 and real export price is 0.8.  In addition, a one percentage 
point in crease in the company tax rate increases tax revenue by about 0.5%. 
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Fig. 3  Labor compensation and net operating surplus as a share of GDP at factor costs and CIT and IIT 
yields, 1983-2006
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Fig 4.  Real prices of products for domestic use (all products, basic metals, and manufactures) realtive to 
CPI (2000=100) and CIT revenues over GDP, 1983-2007
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Fig 5.  Real prices of exports, imports realtive to CPI and foregn exchange (R/F$) (2000=100) and CIT 
revenues over GDP, 1983-2007
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The second set of estimates in Table B.2 is for the logarithm of the company tax yield 
(R/Y) in term of the logarithms of real GDP, real all domestic-use prices, real export 
prices and the company tax rate.  The coefficients represent the tax elasticities of these 
explanatory variables at 1.45, 3.2, 0.8 and 0.9, respectively -- similar values to the first 
set of estimates.  The tax elasticity of the corporate tax rate is estimated at 0.4.  In 
addition, a dummy variable is included for the years in which the Undistributed Profits 
Tax was in force to reflect that the statutory corporate tax rate would have underestimated 
the effective corporate tax rate in those years by an unknown amount. 
 
The last set of estimates in Table B.3 presents a more traditional log-relationship of the 
real company tax revenues with real GDP and the relative prices of all products for 
domestic use and exports, and the company tax rate.  A good fit is achieved with 97% of 
variation in the log of the real tax revenues explained.  These estimates show that a one 
percent real growth in GDP lead to an increase of 2.7% in real company taxes, while a 
one percent increase in the relative price of all domestic use products has led to about a 
3.8% increase in real company tax revenues, and a one percent increase in relative export 
prices to a 0.9% increase in taxes.  A one percentage increase in the company tax rate 
yielded 0.5% increase in taxes.  Note these are similar to the log of tax yield specification 
in Table B.2.  Other explanatory variables were tested, including the real lending rate and 
the private sector wage index, but all gave insignificant or inconsistent results. 
 
What are the implications of these results?  First, economic growth alone (with company 
tax elasticity with respect to GDP in range of 1.45 to 2.7) has not caused the major share 
 
 
 15 
of the increase in the company tax yield, especially with the offsetting effects of a decline 
in the company tax rate.  From 2000 to date, real growth offset by tax rate cuts would 
explain about a one percentage point increase in the company tax yield from 3% to 4%.  
Second, the tax elasticity of about 3.8 for domestic product prices and 0.9 for real export 
prices is consistent with the observed fluctuations in the company tax yield about the 
average of about 4.5% of GDP over the 25 year period under study.  For example, a 10% 
increase in the relative price index for all domestic use products would raise the company 
tax yield by 38% and a 30% increase in the relative export price index would increase it 
by 27%.  The combined effect would be a corporate tax yield of 7.8% of GDP, which is 
consistent with actual outcomes. 
 
While the elasticity of corporate taxes with respect to the corporate tax rate is expected to 
be less than one (possibly around 0.8) because of the changes in the tax base caused by 
changes in the after-tax returns, 0.5 is somewhat lower than expected.  At the same time 
the elasticity with respect to real GDP in the range of 1.45 up to 2.7 is considerably 
higher than expected.  This high real GDP elasticity may reflect changes in the sector mix 
as the economy has been growing with a shift to the tertiary sectors at the expense of the 
primary and secondary sectors.  More detailed sector tax studies may show that these 
rapidly growing tertiary sectors such as finance and telecommunications are yielding 
higher company profits and are possibly qualifying for relatively fewer tax breaks than 
manufacturing and mining, and hence, are increasing the overall effective tax rate of the 
company tax that, in turn, would raise the effective tax elasticity of real GDP above one. 
 
Other factors can add to the volatility of corporate taxes.  These include the effects of loss 
carry forwards and accelerated depreciation.  After an extended period of high 
profitability, the stock of loss carry forwards by companies tends to get run down 
exposing an increasing share of current profits to tax.  This tends to make corporate taxes 
more pro-cyclical.  Accelerated depreciation or other investment incentives tend to work 
in the opposite direction if growth is investment driven.  The recent growth period in 
South Africa, however, was not characterized by increased private investment rates until 
more recently.  In fact, over 1991-2003, gross fixed capital formation by private 
businesses remained close to its average of 11.2% of GDP without ever exceeding 12%.  
Since then, it has grown to 13.7% of GDP in 2006, and Budget estimates and forecasts 
suggest that the investment rate will continue to rise in the medium term.  This can result 
in taxable income being eroded by higher accelerated tax depreciation allowances 
resulting in declining company tax yields.  Access to detailed tax records, however, 
would be required to confirm the extent of these tax deduction timing effects on revenue 
yields.  
 
Looking forward, how long will South Africa enjoy the “product price bonus” in its 
company taxes?  While world commodity prices boomed over 2005-2007, commodity 
prices outside of fuels are expected to moderate or even decline, particularly if the United 
States economic slow down has any strong contagious effects.15
                                                 
15 IMF Economic Outlook, October 2007, in Table A.17 forecasts prices in US dollars of manufactures to 
rise at annual rates of 2.8% in 2008 and 1.7% over 2009-2012 and prices of non-fuel primary commodities 
to decline at annual rates of 6.7% in 2008 and 6.8% in 2009-2012. 
  At the same time, there 
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can be expected to be some cost catch up as input costs rise, the depreciation base 
expands, and labor competes for some of the higher surplus currently accruing to capital.  
The path of the real exchange rate will also have a significant effect on profit margins in 
the tradable sectors.  Any significant real appreciation of the Rand will serve to reduce 
the “product price bonus,” or alternatively, depreciation of the Rand could sustain it at 
least partially. 
 
From the discussion so far it would seem that much of the explanation of company tax 
performance relates to changes in economic structures rather than tax policy changes, or 
at least the changes in real product prices have dominated the changes in company tax 
rates.  While the changes in the tax structure have been significant over the years, as 
illustrated in Table 2, it has only been since 1999/2000 that the tax rate on undistributed 
profits has dropped below one-third and the combined tax on distributed and 
undistributed profits has been on a consistent downward trend.  This has also been the 
period of rapidly rising real product prices that has masked the effects of these tax 
changes on revenues and investment.  At the same time, it does not appear that the higher 
growth rates experienced since 2000 are driven by any marked acceleration in investment 
until the past few years.  Investor confidence does take time to adjust to new economic 
realities.  It is not clear whether the consistent lower and falling company tax rates have 
elicited some of this increased investment.  In a highly competitive global economy, the 
competition to attract and retain capital has become an ongoing and possibly escalating 
battle as capital markets have emerged and merged making capital mobility a more 
common reality in an increasing number of countries.  The issue of whether South Africa 
has taken its company tax rate low enough still appears to be an open question. 
 
The international comparison of corporate tax rates is not a simple matter as the effective 
rate charged on corporate income typically varies according to the ownership of the 
corporation and how corporate income is paid out to the owners, aside from the numerous 
effects arising from accounting conventions, inflation and investment tax incentives.  The 
first major division in ownership comes between widely held corporations (typically with 
publicly traded shares) and closely held corporations (often not traded and family owned 
and possibly also managed).  The second major division occurs between foreign and 
domestically owned corporations.  These divisions focus on two of the major responses 
of owners to corporate (or broadly investment) income taxation.  The first is the ability of 
owner-managers to arbitrage tax rate differences between the personal and corporate 
taxes depending upon how corporate income is earned by them.  The second is the 
expected high responsiveness of investors to differences in net-of-tax rates of return 
across countries – either domestic investors looking to invest in foreign host countries 
rather than domestically, or foreign investors deciding whether to expand investment in 
different host countries.   
 
Most simple international comparisons focus only on the statutory company or corporate 
tax rate charged on profits at the company level.  International competition for investment 
has put downward pressure on corporate tax rates since the 1980s.  One study of a large 
sample of countries showed the average central government statutory corporate tax rate 
dropping from 39.6% (+/- standard deviation of 10.9%) in 1980 to 32.7% (+/- standard 
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deviation of 8.4%) in 1995.16  Data on corporate tax rates over 1998 through 2006 from 
the World Development Indicators 2007 is summarized in Table 3.  This indicates that 
corporate tax rates declined further by about 6 percentage points amongst high- and upper 
middle- income countries.  Interestingly, an increasing number of oil-exporting countries 
set their corporate tax rates at zero, and many new lower middle-income states (former 
Soviet States) have set their corporate tax rates in the 10% through 20% range.   
Combined central and sub-national government corporate tax rates for 30 OECD 
countries over 2000-2007 also show continued rate declines by 6 percentage points on 
average from 33.6% in 2000 to 27.6% in 2007.17
 
  While these statutory tax rates are 
important in that they reflect the first layer of tax on all corporate income, they do not 
capture subsequent withholding taxes or taxes at the personal tax level applied to 
dividend distributions, in particular. 
Country income class Number
1998 2006 Change
High income OECD countries 23 33.4% 27.3% -6.1%
High income non-OECD countries a 25 21.8% 15.3% -6.5%
Upper middle income countries 26 29.8% 24.1% -5.7%
Lower middle income countries b 29 29.8% 28.6% -1.2%
Low income countries 14 31.8% 29.5% -2.3%
Table 3.  Central Government Corporate Tax Rates, 1998 and 2006 by country income class
Average Central Governent Corporate Tax Rate
a. In 1998, 5 countries with zero tax rate; in 2006, 8 countries with zero tax rate
b. Many former Soviet Union states and new Eastern Eurpean states have corporate tax rates in the range of 10% to 20%
Source:  World Bank World Development Indicators 2007  
 
To recognize the greater complexity of the taxation of corporate income, the focus is put 
first on closely held companies.  Here the issue is primarily how the corporate tax 
integrates with the personal tax given owner-managers have choices of how to finance 
and earn income from their companies.  If corporate tax rates exceed personal rates, then 
there is an incentive to reduce taxes by increasing debt rather than equity financing by the 
owners as well as taking out more income as wages.  The added interest and wages 
(without any restrictions on these deductions) become deductible at the higher corporate 
tax rate and taxable at the lower personal tax rate.  By contrast, if personal or individual 
tax rates are higher than corporate rates and dividends are not taxable when received by 
individuals, then there is an incentive to pay dividends over taking income as interest or 
wages.  If there are further taxes such as a final withholding tax (such as the secondary 
company tax or SCT in South Africa) and/or additional personal taxes (which may be 
reduced by partial or full tax integration through dividend deductions or credits) that raise 
the total tax rate on distributed dividends up to or above the personal tax rate, then by 
contrast, there is an incentive to retain profits in the company for active or passive 
reinvestment.   
 
In South Africa, up to 1995/96 the combined tax rate on full distribution of dividends was 
at or above the top MTR in the individual income tax (see Table 2), which would have 
                                                 
16 Joel Slemrod, “Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging?”  Journal of Public Economics 88 
(2004) 1169– 1186, Table 1 
17 SourceOECD Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries, Comparative Tables Vol 2007 release 01 
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discouraged dividend distributions, whereas since then there has been a widening gap 
between the top MTR and the combined tax on full distributions, which would tend to 
encourage dividend distributions as appears to be evident from the growth in the SCT 
yield shown in Table 1.B above.  Currently, there is scope for raising the SCT to close 
this gap.  There is no incentive, however, for using wages and interest to move income 
out of a large company as the tax rate on retained profits has been lower than the top 
MTR except from 1987/88 through 1993/94.  
 
A review of current OECD country tax treatment of distributed company profits shows 
no consistent pattern.  When the final withholding taxes (in the case of seven of the thirty 
OECD countries) and the personal income taxes (adjusted for any tax integration 
provisions) are combined and compared with the top MTRs on personal income, it is 
found that 11 countries have combined tax rates on dividends that are at or above their 
top MTRs, and the remaining 19 have lower combined tax rates. 
 
South Africa also offers a closely-held small business, if it has a turnover below R14 
million, the option of paying tax as a Small Business Corporation at rates rising from 0% 
on the first R46,000 of taxable income, 10% on the next amounts up to R300,000, and 
28% on amounts above R300,000 plus the 10% SCT on distributed dividends.  This gives 
small businesses the same top tax rates as other companies. They are also in a more 
favorable tax position than operating as unincorporated businesses.  One exception is 
personal service business which has to incorporate as an Employment Company facing a 
flat tax rate of 33.3% and 10% SCT.  This puts their combined tax rate on dividend 
distributions at 39.7% (essentially equal to the top MTR of 40%).   
 
This situation for small businesses could be simplified by following the tax integration 
approach used in the United States which allows closely held businesses to set up as S-
Corporations, Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) or Limited Liability Partnerships 
(LLPs)  all of which report their profits at the personal level (without any company 
taxation).  This gives the business perfect tax integration, and at the same time, affords 
them the benefits of limited liability.  The taxation for small closely held companies, 
therefore, could be combined and simplified without any limit to turnover.  This can be 
achieved either by the income of Small Business Corporations being reported as personal 
income (it would get the same tax treatment as other individual income) or by setting the 
tax rates of these companies to rise in line with the personal brackets, but adjusted for the 
STC.18
                                                 
18   The small corporation marginal tax rate, tsc = (tp –STC)/(1-STC)  where STC is the STC rate (currently 
10%) and tp is the marginal personal tax rate.  Companies could be offered the option t pay the lower of the 
company tax rate (28%) or the taxes arising from paying taxes at the rates tsc on income in the PIT brackets 
plus STC on distributed profits. 
  This latter approach would result in the marginal small business tax rates rising 
from 0% to 33.3% following the same bracket structure as the personal tax rate.  If the 
regular company tax is less than 33.3%, as it currently is at a flat 28%, then, as the 
profitability of the company grows, its average tax rate would gradually rise to 28% and 
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it could convert to filing as a regular company or be given the option of paying the lesser 
of the scheduler rates or a flat 28%.19
 
   
Widely held companies are the other major ownership type.  In this case, ownership may 
be held by insurance funds, pension funds, non-government organizations, trusts, 
domestic individuals and foreign persons.  Such widely held companies typically have to 
pay the going market rates of return, net-of-taxes at the company level, to attract 
investment capital.  For most countries the marginal supply of capital that sets the market 
rate is net foreign savings by domestic savers repatriating capital or foreign savers 
increasing their investments.  Such market returns effectively separate the investor or 
user of capital from the saver or supplier of capital such that the tax treatment of the two 
can be analyzed separately.  Hence, in viewing the incentives of foreign investor it is 
sufficient to look at the company tax rate plus the withholding or other taxes charged on 
distributions to non-residents.   
 
If domestic private savings are taken as relatively fixed, then a combination of 
government and net foreign savings tends to determine investment and growth.  If an 
economy is open with low country risk and faces a fixed prices of capital funds, but 
relatively unlimited supply of foreign savings, then competing for capital through 
lowering tax rates relative to capital-source countries should expand investment 
significantly.  The ultimate impact of such expanded investment, given a fixed price of 
capital, accrues to labor as the capital intensity of the economy increases while capital 
owners earn the fixed return.  This insight has led many countries to lower their first layer 
corporate tax rates on undistributed profits below their top MTRs and often below the 
company tax rates of competing countries.20
 
  At the same time, care has to be taken to 
ensure that lower host country taxes do not merely result in added taxes going to the 
home country treasury through the taxation of world-wide income by the home country at 
a higher tax rate.  Lowering a host country tax rate down to the level of the home country, 
however, does not risk such pointless revenue transfers and can gain the benefits of 
expanded investment through induced foreign investment.  Part of the issue, therefore, is 
knowing the tax structures of the home or capital-source countries of foreign investors as 
well as how responsive they are to changes in host country investment returns.  This 
includes whether the host country profits are only taxed when repatriated as dividends or 
whether the full current accrued income becomes taxable.  As long as the former is the 
case, the host country can lower its first layer of corporate tax while setting withholding 
taxes to capture the difference between this host and home country rates on repatriated 
dividends (in the same way it can equalize taxes on domestic dividends with the personal 
marginal tax rate.)  The lower first layer corporate tax rate should at a least encourage a 
business to reinvest its profits rather than repatriate them, thereby expanding investment 
in the host country. 
                                                 
19 With current personal marginal tax rates and awarding the small business primary tax rebate, the 
switchover would happen at about R1.25 million or at a before-tax profit margin of 20%, a turnover of 
R6.25 million. 
20 See for example, Alberto Barreix and Jerónimo Roca, “Strengthening a fiscal pillar: 
the Uruguayan dual income tax”, Cepal Review, No. 92, August 2007 
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The following are some examples of countries with low central government corporate tax 
rates (below 30%):  Switzerland, 8.5% (21.32%)21; Cyprus, Paraguay and Serbia, 10%; 
Macao, Oman, Uruguay and Uzbekistan, 12%; Ireland, 12.5%; Latvia, 15%; Romania, 
16%; Hungary, 16% (20%)22; Chile 17%; Hong Kong 17.5%; Iceland, 18%; Poland and 
Slovak Republic, 19%; Cambodia, Croatia, Georgia, Hungary, and Turkey, 20%; Canada, 
22.1% (36.1%)20; Estonia, 23%; Czech Republic, 24% (36.8%)23
 
; China, Denmark, 
Ghana, and Mauritius, 25%; Korea, 25% (27.5%)20;  Germany 25% (38.9%)20, 21; Austria, 
25% (43.8%)22; Netherlands (25.5%); Finland (26%); and Mexico, Norway and Sweden, 
28%.  Some of these countries such as Hong Kong, Ireland and Mauritius have followed 
low corporate tax rate policies for time with some success.  Many others have only 
recently restructured their rates and which of them will be relatively more successful in 
attracting capital investment remains to be ascertained.  Some have added sub-national 
taxes or surtaxes that raise their rates significantly, and others, like South Africa, have 
final secondary or withholding taxes on distributed dividends.  The remainder merely has 
low tax rates at the corporate level. 
While South Africa has seen some moderately good growth over recent years, it has not 
benefited from any marked increase in investment rates to increase its growth rates from 
4-5% to 6-7% in order to absorb the still high number of unemployed and continue to 
raise real wage rates.  Further lowering of the company tax rate from its current rate of 
28% to meet the ever growing tax competition for investment, while increasing the SCT 
rate or withholding tax rates on distributed dividends, should contribute to investment 
promotion.  South Africa still has some room to increase rates on the SCT, VAT and 
excise duties to enhance its revenues, though it clearly faces some fiscal risks through 
company tax yields declining and rising social security expenditures.  It can expect to 
gradually loose the company tax revenue bubble it has enjoyed from high real product 
prices and also will need to finance growing demands for expanded social security 
benefits. 
                                                 
21 Combined central and sub-national corporate tax rate 
22 Combined corporate tax and surtax 
23 Including final withholding tax on distributed dividends. 
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Annex A 
 
Estimation of Individual Tax Revenues 
 
 
Dependent variable:  
Variable Definition
Explanatory Variables Ln(GDP)
Ln(Real wage rate)
Top MTR
Coefficient t-statistic Probability
Constant -0.2902 -0.0665 95%
Ln(GDP) 0.5048 1.2463 23%
Ln(Real wage rate) 0.8855 2.1772 4%
Top MTR 1.5211 1.9779 6%
First order auto regression 
in error 0.8001 9.6227 0%
Adjusted R2 97.3%
Observations 23
F-statistic 200.4 0%
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.48
Table A.   Estimates of Individual Income Tax, South Africa, 
1983/84-2006/07
Log of total remuneration 
per worker (KBP7013J) 
     Top marginal tax rate in 
personal income tax (%)
Log of real GDP in constant 
2000 prices
Natural log of constant value individual income tax 
Individual income tax values adjusted by 2000 
consumer price index
 
 
Data Sources:  Reserve Bank of South Africa and National Treasury, South Africa
 
 
 22 
Annex B 
 
Estimation of Company Tax Revenues 
 
Dependent variable:  
Variable Definition
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient t-statistic Probability Coefficient t-statistic Probability Coefficient t-statistic Probability
Constant -0.1786 -3.04 1% -0.1956 -8.51 0% -1.2090 -9.15 0%
NOS/GDP 0.1658 3.38 0%
Real GDP 8.2100E-08 7.85 0%
Ln(Real GDP) 0.07867 8.24 0%
Real all industry prices 0.00134 2.24 4% 0.00106 3.23 0% 0.00109 3.65 0%
Real export prices 0.00031 2.04 6% 0.00031 3.87 0% 0.00033 4.43 0%
Company tax rate 0.0569 2.39 3% 0.0685 2.92 1%
First order auto 
regression in error 0.4922 1.89 7% 0.0025 0.01 99% -0.1988 -0.87 40%
Adjusted R2 87.2% 95.3% 92.9%
Observations 23 23 23
F-statistic 38.6 0% 89.7 0% 72.9 0%
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.83 2.42 1.87
Real GDP 1.54 1.74
Real all industry prices 2.50 2.57
Real export prices 0.75 0.79
Company tax rate 0.53 0.64
Company tax rate assuming 30% dividend distributions
Elasticities of company tax revenue with respect to explanatory variables (calculated at sample average values)
Company tax rate
Company income tax values (including secondary company tax) over GDP at current market 
prices
Net operating surplus (KBP6001J) over GDP (%)
Table B.1   Estimates of Company Income Tax as a share of GDP, South Africa, 198384-2006/07
Company income tax over GDP (%)
NOS/GDP
Real all industry prices
Real GDP in constant 2000 prices
Price index of all products for domestic use (KBP7048J) 
adjusted to 2000 prices by CPI (KBP7032J)
Real export prices Price index of export goods and services (KBP5033J) adjusted 
to 2000 prices by CPI (KBP7032J)
Real GDP
 
 
Data Sources:  Reserve Bank of South Africa and National Treasury, South Africa 
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Dependent variable:  
Variable Definition
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient t-statistic Probability Coefficient t-statistic Probability
Constant -41.67 -14.88 0% -40.14 -14.95 0%
Ln(real GDP) 1.45 8.13 0% 1.30 5.93 0%
Ln(real all industry prices) 3.16 4.98 0% 3.27 5.38 0%
Ln(real export prices) 0.76 4.71 0% 0.92 4.98 0%
Company tax rate 0.94 2.08 5%
Ln(Company tax rate) 0.37 1.96 7%
D_UDPT*Ln(Company tax rate) 0.12 1.41 18%
First order auto regression in 
error -0.33 -1.46 16% -0.40 -1.77 10%
Adjusted R2 95.5% 95.7%
Observations 23 23
F-statistic 94.6 0% 83.6 0%
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.02 2.11
D_UDPT Dummy =1 for years (1981-1990) with Undistributed Profits 
Tax (UDPT), otherwise = 0
Table B.2   Estimates of Company Income Tax over GDP, South Africa, 1983/84-2006/07
Natural log of company income tax over GDP (%)
Company income tax values (including secondary company tax) over GDP at current market 
prices
Log of real GDP in constant 2000 pricesLn(real GDP)
Company tax rate Company tax rate assuming 30% dividend distributions
Ln(real all industry prices)
Ln(real export prices)
Log of prices of all products for domestic use (KBP7048J) 
adjusted to 2000 prices by CPI (KBP7032J)
Log of prices of export goods and services (KBP5033J) adjusted 
to 2000 prices by CPI (KBP7032J)
 
 
Data Sources:  Reserve Bank of South Africa and National Treasury, South Africa 
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Dependent variable:  
Variable Definition
Explanatory Variables
Coefficient t-statistic Probability Coefficient t-statistic Probability
Constant -49.15 -14.42 0% -47.25 -15.00 0%
Ln(real GDP) 2.84 12.91 0% 2.65 10.37 0%
Ln(real all industry prices) 3.70 4.66 0% 3.83 5.27 0%
Ln(real export prices) 0.67 3.31 0% 0.88 4.01 0%
Company tax rate 1.19 2.11 5%
Ln(Company tax rate) 0.48 2.12 5%
D_UDPT*Ln(Company tax rate) 0.16 1.61 13%
First order auto regression in 
error -0.21 -0.87 40% -0.30 -1.28 22%
Adjusted R2 97.0% 97.3%
Observations 23 23
F-statistic 144.1 0% 131.6 0%
Durbin-Watson statistic 1.97 2.08
Ln(real all industry prices)
D_UDPT Dummy =1 for years (1981-1990) with Undistributed 
Profits Tax (UDPT), otherwise = 0
Log of prices of all products for domestic use (KBP7048J) 
adjusted to 2000 prices by CPI (KBP7032J)
Company tax rate Company tax rate assuming 30% dividend distributions
Table B.3   Estimates of Company Income Tax, South Africa, 1983/84-2006/07
Natural log of constant value company income tax 
Company income tax values (including secondary company tax) adjusted by 2000 
consumer price index (KBP7032J)
Ln(real GDP) Log of real GDP in constant 2000 prices
Ln(real export prices) Log of prices of export goods and services (KBP5033J) 
adjusted to 2000 prices by CPI (KBP7032J)
 
 
 
Data Sources:  Reserve Bank of South Africa and National Treasury, South Africa 
 
